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Abstract/executive summary 
This paper examines the role of ENGOs in the context of the Antarctic environmental regime. It 
highlights some of the challenges surrounding international environmental politics, methods used by 
ENGOs to achieve their goals, and ENGO involvement in international environmental regimes. It goes 
on to outline the role and development of NGOs in the Antarctic context. This paper employs 
furthermore employs Betsill and Corell’s framework of analyses to assess the involvement of ENGOs 
in the Ross Sea marine protected area agreement. Through an exercise of process tracing exercise it 
finds the influence of ENGOs, particularly with issue-framing and agenda setting, to be considerable. 
Ultimately this paper argues that ENGOs are a significant asset to the Antarctic environmental 
regime due to their position as a nexus between state and public and their ability to promote 
environmental protection free from geopolitical considerations. 
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Introduction 
The final decades of the 20th century witnessed the rise of the international environmental 
movement, which has continued into the 21st century. Parallel to the environmental movement has 
been the development of environmental non-governmental organizations, or ENGOs. ENGOs 
operate at both the nation and international level and attempt to influence decisions-makers 
towards implementing environmentally-conscious policy. The rise of ENGOs in international politics 
has challenged the realist notion that state is the primary actor in international affairs, as it has been 
demonstrated that “non-state actors also possess capabilities that can be used to shape 
international outcomes” (Corell and Betsill 2008, p. 22). It is the hope of ENGOs that these 
capabilities can be used to implement measures towards environmental protection. 
The case of ENGO involvement in Antarctic conservation can provide researchers with a valuable 
insight into the dynamics of environmental protection in the international system. Antarctica is often 
both conceptualized as being ‘a pole apart’ from the world, both in terms of its geographical location 
and its unique political situation (Elliott 1994, p. 1). Thus, an overriding and pertinent theme in 
examining ENGO involvement in the Antarctic environmental regime is whether or not the ‘ordinary’ 
politics of the international system are relevant in an Antarctic context (Herr 1996, p. 92). Lorraine 
Elliott argues that indeed they are, and that by examining how environmental issues are managed in 
the Antarctic we can gain a better understanding of the difficulties of addressing environmental 
issues in other parts of the world (Elliott 1994, pp. 1-2).  
This paper will examine the issue of ENGO involvement in environmental protection in an Antarctic 
context. It will proceed in three part. Part one will begin by outlining the challenges of 
environmental politics in the international system, before discussing ENGOs as international actors 
and the role that they play in the international system. Part two will examine ENGOs in an Antarctic 
context, briefly exploring the Antarctic environmental regime and the rise of ENGOs within it before 
outlining the methods Antarctic ENGOs employ in pursuing their goals. Part three will critically 
analyse the role of ENGOs in the Antarctic with a case study on their influence in the Ross Sea 
marine protected area (MPA) agreement of 2016. To do so, this paper will employ Betsill and Corell’s 
(2008) framework of analyses for assessing the influence of ENGOs in international environmental 
negotiations. This paper ultimately argues that ENGOs are a significant asset to the Antarctic 
environmental regime due to their position as a nexus between state and public and their ability to 
promote environmental protection free from geopolitical considerations.  
1 Environmental Non-governmental Organizations in Global Environmental politics 
1.1 Environmental Protection in the International System 
Environmental considerations are arguably among the most pressing concerns for policy-makers in 
the 21st century. The international environmental movement blossomed in the late 1960s and early 
1970s due to an increase in public interest and awareness of environmental issues. These were 
largely driven by advances in scientific knowledge, a series of widely-publicized environmental 
disasters, growing concerns over nuclear testing and the threat of nuclear fallout, and the 
publication of several notable environmental books, such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(McCormick 2005, p. 89). In response to growing international concern, the United Nation organized 
a Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 in Stockholm, Sweden, attended by 119 states. 
Known as the Stockholm conference, this was “the first meeting at which a combination of 
T. Lord, p. 4 
 
governments and NGOs from around the world sat down to address the global aspects of the 
emerging environmental crisis” (McCormick 2005, p. 89). This lead to the establishment of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “a permanent forum for monitoring global 
environmental trends, convening international meetings and conferences, and negotiating 
international agreements (Vig 2005, p. 1). Since 1972 there have been numerous international 
conferences on environmental management. Notable examples include the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1987 where the term ‘sustainable development’ was adopted by 
United Nation, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the ‘Earth 
Summit’) in 1992, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 and UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development in 2012 (United Nations 2017). 
Despite these international conferences and the ever-growing public support for environmental 
action, “the record of local and national governments in addressing the causes and consequences of 
environmental damage has been mixed at best. Lip service has been paid to the importance of 
environmental management, but practical action has often fallen short of government 
pronouncements” (McCormick 2005, p. 83). These systematic failures by governments has led some 
commentators to suggest  that the current international politic system is inadequate to deal with 
unfamiliar and extreme issues such as global environmental degradation (McCormick 2005, p. 83). 
This failure to address environmental issues has arguably led to a worsening of these issues. John 
McCormick suggests that failure to act has been driven by three key factors. The first revolves 
around the lack of scientific consensus on the causes and effects of environmental issues, allowing 
policy-makers “to err on the side of caution in making their policy calculations” (2005, p. 85). 
Second, states have been particularly concerned about the economic and financial costs of taking 
steps towards more sustainable societies. Finally, states have had little incentive to meet 
environmental obligations, for although they may be party to international organizations and 
treaties, due to the anarchical nature of the international system there are few powers of coercion 
over states to meet environmental agreements (McCormick 2005, p. 85). This is echoed by Lorraine 
Elliott, who contends that measures adopted by states are often inadequate due to compromises 
arising from national self-interest, and that in the absence of any central authority monitoring state 
activity compliance is often minimal (1994, p. 2). A further key issue in effective environmental 
protection is what is known as the ‘double-bind’, whereby while it may be in the best interest of 
states in the long run to engage in environmental protection, “states will not participate in such 
cooperative efforts unless there is some guarantee that other states will do likewise” (Hurrell and 
Kingsbury 1992, p. 4).  
1.2 What are NGOs? 
Elliott has observed that there is a growing recognition from policy-makers and the general public 
that global environmental issues require creative solutions from a variety of actors (1994, p. 2). Due 
to the perceived failings of the state system to address such matters, McCormick argues that private 
citizens have risen to the challenge of environmental protection “by attempting to generate 
pressure for political change through the work of NGOs” (2005, p. 83). An NGO can be considered as 
“group of people (or coalitions of organizations) who come together outside the formal structures of 
government in an institutionalized and regular manner in an effort to achieve social, economic, or 
political change” (McCormick 2005, p. 86). This is consistent with Betsill and Corell’s definition, who 
draw on Oberthür et al.’s (2002) conceptions of NGOs and suggest that there are three criteria which 
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an NGO must meet: “(1) that it is not formed by a government agreement, (2) has expertise or 
interests relevant to the international institution, and (3) expresses views that are independent of 
any national government” (2008, p. 5). An environmental NGO can thus be considered as an NGO 
who has expertise or interest in one or many environmental issues. 
NGOs broadly fit into two categories: special-interest, or sectional, NGOs that focus on specific 
issues, and social-advocacy, or promotional, NGOs that appeal to mass public interest (Herr 1996, p. 
93). NGOs use different strategies to achieve their goals depending on which camp they occupy. 
Sectional NGOs, for example, traditionally use ‘insider’ tactics, or activities that seek to directly 
influence policy-makers through the provision of expert advice or policy analysis (Böhmelt and 
Betzold 2013, p. 129). Sectional NGO representatives often have direct access to government 
officials and can use diplomatic pressure to affect change. Promotional NGOs, on the other hand, 
typically rely on ‘outsider’ tactics which attempt to put pressure on diplomats and policy-makers by 
influencing public opinion on an issue (Böhmelt and Betzold 2013, p. 129). They often engage in 
direct action through organizing mass public demonstrations and protests. Environmental NGOs, it 
can be argued, occupy a unique position between both these groups. While ENGOs such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth frequently engage in public outreach campaigns and organize 
demonstrations and protests, their activities often have a narrow focus on a particular 
environmental issue, such as Greenpeace’s ongoing ‘Save the Arctic’ campaign (Greenpeace 2017). 
By conducting research to help with their campaigns, ENGOs can acquire specialized knowledge 
around a particular issue, thus giving them legitimacy in environmental regimes and allowing them 
to employ insider tactics. 
Legitimacy is a key concept for any international actor. Legitimacy for ENGOs comes from two 
sources; the public who they claim to represent, and the wider environmental regime that they are a 
part of. To explain this, Herr draws attention to David Mitrany’s (1981) argument, which suggests 
that the state is insufficient in providing the technical and functional needs of its citizens, and is thus 
an impractical and inappropriate mechanism for promoting common interests across national 
boundaries, such as environmental protection. Mitrany goes on to suggest that “since people want 
their needs met, they will seek other sources of authority to promote the cooperative interaction 
which can meet their needs. By investing in non-governmental associations with their trust, people 
create an alternative source of influence” (Mitrany 1981, in Herr 1996, p. 94). So long as ENGOs 
reflect the interests of their members, they can be considered legitimate actors. McCormick follows 
a similar line of argument, suggesting that, in most cases, “NGOs were created because citizens felt 
that the state was not dealing effectively with a particular problem”, such as environmental 
protection (McCormick 2005, p. 99). ENGO legitimacy thus comes from their ability to promote the 
interests of their supporters.  
ENGOs also gain legitimacy through being recognized as valid actors by states and environmental 
regimes and institutions. By possessing scientific and technical knowledge, ENGO representatives 
may be brought inside diplomatic processes by providing policy advice, through roles as advisors to 
national delegations in negotiations, or as invited observers to international meetings. Expert 
knowledge thus becomes a form of currency for ENGOs to help them gain legitimacy from states and 
environmental regimes. Because ENGOs gain their legitimacy from both their supporters and from 
states and environmental regimes, ENGOs can be thought of as occupying a middle space between 
the public and the state, reaching down for public support for their campaigns, aims and goals, but 
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also reaching up to influence states and international regimes by being knowledge-based actors. As 
will be discussed subsequently, the occupation of this middle areas allows them a range of strategies 
in vying for influence in environmental governance. 
1.3 How do ENGOs achieve their goals? 
Overall ENGOs seek to facilitate change in the international system in favour of environmental 
protection. To do so, ENGOs can wear many different hats and take on a diverse range of activities. 
First, they act as information-brokers, gathering data on the state of the environment, identifying 
environmental issues, and drafting creative solutions. Through this they can become a major source 
for policy decisions (McCormick 2005, p. 100). Second, ENGOs take on the role of watchdogs and 
whistle-blowers, helping to keep track of the progress of actors in the implementation of 
international agreements. Indeed, as McCormick suggests, “without NGO pressure, there would be 
little obligation upon states to agree to substantial goals, and there would be little transparency in 
the process of agreeing and implementing international treaties” (2005, p. 100). Third, ENGOs 
attempt to define and influence national interest, direction and policy in regard to environmental 
management. Fourth, ENGOs seeks to promote public concern and awareness for environmental 
issues. Finally, ENGOs attempt to provide a link between the voices and concerns of public and 
policy-makers (Elliott 1994, p. 19). 
ENGOs attempt to fulfil these roles and goals in a variety of different ways. Arguably the primary 
action that NGOs take is lobbying at both the national and the international level. They can do this in 
several ways. One method is to work with elected officials at the domestic level, making submissions 
on policy proposals or by being advisors to diplomats at negotiations. Another method for lobbying 
is the submission of papers at international negotiations, provided they have access to these. The 
level of ENGO access to international meetings relies upon their credibility as legitimate actors in the 
international system, which, as previously mentioned, stems from their credibility as repositories of 
knowledge on a particular issue. A second method for lobbying that ENGOs have available to them is 
mobilizing public support for an issue through campaigning and organizing public demonstrations 
and protests. While many observers suggest that NGOs have more success using ‘insider’ tactics, 
Kimball suggests the efficiency of lobbying depends on the lobbyist, the audience and the issue. 
Indeed, as Kimball argues, “elected officials may be more influenced by a demonstration that their 
positions on the issue are likely to affect their showing in the polls, whereas a career civil servant 
may respond more to factual information” (Kimball 1988, p. 49). 
A second way ENGOs seek to achieve their goals involves promoting media coverage of 
environmental issues. This once again relates back to NGOs being sources of knowledge, for this 
credibility often makes them the first point of call for journalists (Hague and Harrop 2013). 
Furthermore, McCormick claims that “studies have repeatedly found that environmental groups 
believe the media is generally sympathetic to their cause”, and thus most groups attempt to 
generate significant media attention for through demonstrations, marches or protests (McCormick 
2005, p. 96). Finally, to help carry out their roles, ENGOs undertake their own original research and 
organize for that data to be shared with other NGOs. This helps keep all groups up-to-date on 
particular issues, thus allowing for ENGOs to take a unified stance on issues. 
It is important to note, however, that ENGOs should not be seen as a homogenous global 
community, for organizations “use many different methods, often have different priorities and 
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objectives, and vary substantially in size, goals, durability, stability, credibility, and ideological 
orientations” (McCormick 2005, p. 91). Many organizations, such as Greenpeace and Friend of the 
Earth, take a hard-line approach to environmental issues, using public demonstrations, protests, and 
direct action as a means to bring about change (McCormick 2005, p. 93). Other groups believe that 
more effective action can occur through diplomatic channels and political pressure. McCormick 
notes that while Greenpeace in recent years “have become less confrontational and more willing to 
work within established political procedures,” there is still a focus on ‘bearing witness’, “that is, by 
drawing attention to an abuse of the environment through their unwavering presence at the scene, 
whatever the risk” (2005, p. 93). It is thus possible for groups to change approaches and play 
different roles in the international system. 
1.4 ENGO involvement in international environmental regimes and governance 
Non-governmental actors are playing an increasingly significant role in international environmental 
regimes and governance (Vig 2005). Marvin Soroos considers the term ‘international regime’ to refer 
to the “combination of international institutions, customary norms and principles, and formal treaty 
commitments that guide how states relate to a specific subject, problem, or region” (2005, p. 21). 
The United Nations Environmental Programme is an example of such a regime. As international 
environmental regimes are built by international actors and institutions, Soroos notes that 
environmental regimes have been “complemented by a rise in the number and influence of 
nongovernmental organizations” (2005, p. 22). International environmental regimes in turn help 
contribute to environmental governance. Governance refers to the activity, process or quality of 
governing, without presupposing a central government or authority (Hague and Harrop 2013). 
Norman Vig suggests that governance happens by coordination of action which can “occur through 
many different institutions, including private social and economic systems and non-governmental 
organizations (2005, p. 4). By contributing to environmental regimes through their input and 
participation, ENGOs can be considered to be actors in international environmental governance.  
 
There is an inherent tension between state and non-state actors in international regimes, however.  
While Elliott notes that ENGOs are increasingly being brought ‘inside’ the diplomatic process through 
participation in national delegations and as observers in international meetings and negotiations, 
these activities “remain primarily an inter-governmental affair, and states keep the prerogative to 
determine which non-governmental actors may participate” (Böhmelt and Betzold 2013, p. 128). 
This demonstrates that while ENGOs are becoming increasingly prominent actors in the international 
system, states continue to maintain a monopoly on influence in the international system. 
Notwithstanding, Böhmelt and Betzold believe that there a two key factors regarding ENGO 
influence in international meetings and negotiations: namely, the level of access they have to the 
negotiations, and number of ENGOs actively participating in the negotiations. Better access to 
negotiations, through both membership in national delegations and direct access as participants or 
observers, facilitates greater ENGO input, and thus should “also lead to bargaining outcomes that 
reflect ENGO positions more closely” (Böhmelt and Betzold 2013, p. 131). Böhmelt and Betzold 
further argue that if ENGOs have greater access international negotiations, they “are generally 
better able to create leverage over official state negotiators, which then increases the chances that 
states are more likely to commit to stronger environmental agreements” (2013, p. 143). 
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2 The Role and Development of NGOs in the Antarctic Environmental Regime 
The Antarctic case study provides an opportunity for scholars to examine whether or not the 
‘ordinary’ politics of the international system are relevant in an Antarctic context (Herr 1996, p. 92). 
As previously noted, the rise of ENGOs is arguably due to the state being viewed as an inefficient 
actor in dealing with environmental issues. Herr reflects this argument, contending that “where the 
legitimate authority of the state is unclear, disputed or impractical, some other source of legitimacy 
will be found or created” (1996, p. 92). Due to the unique nature of Antarctic politics arising from 
frozen territorial claims and unresolved sovereignty issues, one could assume that non-state actors 
would come to fore in Antarctic governance. Herr has noted, however, that despite issues of 
sovereignty “the state system has demonstrated a considerable degree of resilience in Anarctica” 
(Herr 1996, p. 96). Against this backdrop, this section will examine the nature of the Antarctic 
environmental regime, the rise of ENGOs in Antarctic environmental affairs, and how ENGOs operate 
within the Antarctic environmental regime. 
2. 1 The Antarctic Environmental Regime 
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 forms the basis of governance in the Antarctic. There are currently 29 
consultative parties (ATCPs) who have full voting rights at the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings (ATCMs), and 24 non-consultative parties. As Christopher Joyner has noted, “as a 
multilateral accord, the Antarctic Treaty has been given high marks for its success in mandating 
demilitarization and denuclearization of the area”, as well as facilitating scientific research and 
cooperation (1998, p 21). Antarctic is thus often referred to as a continent exclusively for peace and 
science. When the treaty first entered into force, however, environmental considerations were 
initially subordinate to the political and scientific considerations of the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS), namely the issues of sovereignty, logistic convenience and the facilitation of scientific research 
(Elliott 1994, p. 53). The extent of environmental protection measures in the original agreement 
included clauses that prohibited nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste, and 
recommend that signatories should take measures towards the “preservation and conservation of 
living resources in Antarctica” (Antarctic Treaty, article IX, para 1(f)). Lorraine Elliott notes that due 
to the initial limited amount of international attention in the Antarctic, combined with the low level 
of concern for (or ignorance of) environmental issues in general, “potential difficulties over the 
inadequacies of environmental rules and implementation could be masked” (1994, p. 56).  
The growth of environmental concern for the Antarctic mirrored the growth of the global 
environmental movement. Following the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty by member states in 
1962, a number of measures concerning environmental protection were passed. These included of 
the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna in 1964, the Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals in 1972, and the far more comprehensive Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR) in 1982 (Blay 1992). To help implement its 
objectives, CCAMLR established a Secretariat, a Commission and a Scientific Committee (Blay 1992, 
p. 382). While being primarily concerned with “preserving and protecting the integrity of the 
Antarctic seas ecosystem”, CCAMLR has a wide jurisdictional reach and facilitates annual meetings 
between member parties (Joyner 1998, p. 69). 
By the mid-1970s, many countries had begun to express an interest in mining in the Antarctic 
following “geological research which suggested that the mineral wealth of the continent, both 
onshore and offshore, was potentially exploitable” (Herr 1996, p. 98). The Convention for the 
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Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) was negotiated by treaty parties 
throughout the 1980s in order to try and regulate potential Antarctic mining in the future, however 
after Australia and France failed to ratify the resultant document, the agreement fell through (Joyner 
1998). Following the demise of CRAMRA the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty, or the Madrid Protocol, was negotiated and signed by ATCMs in 1991, entering into force 
several years later in 1998. The Protocol represented a significant step forward in terms of 
environmental protection for the Antarctic as it “provides for comprehensive regulation over 
activities affecting the Antarctic environment” (Joyner 1998, p. 79). The Protocol established a new 
institutional body, the Committee for Environmental Protection, which allowed a seat for each ATCP 
and would provide advice and recommendations to ATCMs (Joyner 1998, p. 79). Following the 
implementation of the Madrid protocol, there has been a noticeable absence in the passing on 
activity within the ATS since 1998. In 2009 CCAMLR agreed to designate 94 000 km2 of Sea 
surrounding the South Orkney Islands a marine protected area (MPA), followed by the Ross Sea MPA 
agreement in October 2016 (CCAMLR 2016 (website). 
2.2 Growth of NGOs in Antarctic Affairs 
ENGO interest in the Antarctic mirrored the blossoming international environmental movement. 
Throughout the late-1970s there was increased interest in Antarctic affairs, and this continued to 
grow throughout the 1980s due to the ongoing CCRAMRA negotiations and ENGO concerns about 
environmental consequences of Antarctic mining. As well as arguing for greater environmental 
protection measures in the Antarctic, ENGOs also “sought to impose transparency and accountability 
on the Treaty parties” (Elliott 1994, p. 58). Initial involvement by ENGOs in Antarctic affairs was 
rather limited; with no formal mechanism for inclusion in ATCM meetings, representatives of ENGOs 
such as the US-based Canter for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) and the Sierra Club would stand 
outside of meetings, distributing position papers with the hope of influencing national delegates 
(Kimball 1988, p. 36). Towards the end of the 1970s, however, ENGO representatives were starting 
to be included on national delegations to ATCMs, thus having direct access to proceedings and the 
opportunity to contribute to the positions of states (Tin 2013, p. 416). The first occasion of this was 
in 1977, when the Director of the Sierra Club International Office was invited to become a member 
of the US delegation to the ATCM IX in London, and also later in 1978 at the ATCM X in Washington 
D.C. (Kimball 1988, p. 36). 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) was the first 
ENGOs to gain formal access to the ATS (Herr 1996, p. 100). The IUCN, established in 1948 in an 
umbrella organization, includes both government and non-government organizations, and thus does 
not fit neatly into the ‘ENGO’ box. While it shares a strong advocacy stance on Antarctic issues with 
ENGOs such as Greenpeace, Elliott notes that the IUCN sees its role as “one of providing advice and 
expertise to promote conservation objectives” (1994, p. 59). Herr agrees with this view, and suggests 
that this legitimacy as a ‘knowledge-based actor’ has stood it in good stead in its dealings with the 
ATS (1996, p. 100). The IUCN was involved in the drafting of the CCAMLR agreement in which it 
fought for NGO access, and the final agreement “provides for the Commission and its Scientific 
Committee to consult with NGOs” (Herr 1996, p. 100). The IUCN was subsequently granted ‘invited 
expert’ status at the ATCM XIV in 1987, and has regularly attended as an observer since. 
Another key Antarctic ENGO is the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), founded in 1977 
“to provide coordination between national NGOs so that the developing expertise and knowledge 
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could best be used collectively” (Elliott 1994, p. 58). ASOC is again an umbrella group for a coalition 
of over 30 ENGOs with an Antarctic interest (ASOC 2016). Although the group was initially viewed 
rather negatively by ATCPs due to ASOC’s methods of direct action, perceptions of the group 
“gradually yielded to an appreciation that ASOC resources [could] add constructively to Antarctic 
decision-making processes” (Herr 1996, p. 101). By the mid-1980s ASOC representatives had 
attained individual positions on national delegations, while in 1988 it gained observer status within 
CCAMLR meetings and in 1991 with CCAMLR’s scientific committee (Herr 1996, p. 101). ASOC was 
included in the 1990 session of the XI Special Consultative Meeting as an invited expert, and has 
remained an observer at each ATCM since (Herr 1996, p. 101). A major strength of ASOC is its ability 
to enable a variety of NGOs “to participate in and become knowledgeable of Antarctic issues without 
having to make a large investment in either personal or money” (Clark 1994, p. 164). Thus ASOC has 
allowed for smaller groups to be represented in Antarctic issues.  
Greenpeace is third key actor in Antarctic environmental affairs, becoming involved in 1983 
“reacting to pressure for involvement in the nascent CRAMRA convention” (Herr 1996, p. 101). Herr 
has noted that although arriving to the table rather late, Greenpeace accepted the self-assigned 
challenge of opposing CRAMRA with extraordinary energy and flair, devoting an uncommon amount 
of resources to the task (Herr 1996, p. 101). Due to their tactics of direct action, however, formal 
acceptance of Greenpeace as a player in the ATS as always been problematic, and they are often 
seen as being “more of a gadfly than a serious reformer in the eyes of many actors within the ATS” 
(Herr 1996, p. 102). Nevertheless, Greenpeace’s involvement in the ATS can be considered as 
somewhat as an anomaly. While Greenpeace has traditionally been a promotional NGO with a 
philosophy of direct action and relying heavily upon mass support for its legitimacy, in the case of 
the Antarctic Greenpeace seemed to be unwilling to rely solely upon popular acceptance to achieve 
its goal of having the Antarctic designated as a ‘world park’ in the 1980s. Herr has observed that 
“even while attacking the basis of the state system (muted though sovereignty is in Antarctica), 
Greenpeace perused a tactic of acting as though it was eligible to become a formal member of the 
inner circle of decision-makers within the ATS – the Consultative Parties” (1996, p. 102). Greenpeace 
established its World Park base on Ross Island, and took it upon itself to conduct inspections of the 
bases of other states operating in the Antarctic. Herr has noted that “while some Consultative 
Parties appear to have regarded these activities as a parody of the ATS, Greenpeace seems to have 
genuinely intended its attempt to operate in a Consultative Party fashion to give it legitimacy in the 
ATS” (1996, p. 102). However, despite essentially fulfilling the criteria to be accepted as an ATCP, 
Greenpeace’s “antagonism of some Consultative Parties has denied it a formal involvement in its 
own right in the ATS at any level” (Herr 1996, p. 102). As Kimball explains, “In 1984 the [CCAMLR] 
Commission decided to consider only the ASOC request [for membership], since ASOC was a 
coalition composed of a number of constituent bodies, including Greenpeace” (Kimball 1988, p. 44).  
NGO involvement in the ATS in the last twenty years has been somewhat muted. As previously 
noted, there have been little developments in the ATS for since the Madrid Protocol was established. 
Tina Tin suggests that following the ratification of the Madrid protocol “Antarctica left the public 
stage as both the general public and ENGOs assumed that the battle was no ‘won’, Antarctica ‘saved’ 
and efforts could be turned towards more urgent problems elsewhere” (2013, p. 417). Thus, “the 
involvement of national ENGOs in Antarctic issues appeared to decrease substantially” (Tin 2013, p. 
417).  However, as will be examined in more depth subsequently, ENGOs have been considerably 
involved in the process of the Ross Sea MPA agreement throughout the late 2000s. 
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2.3 Role of NGOs in the Antarctic environmental regime 
As with ENGOs operating elsewhere, the role for Antarctic ENGOs such as ASOC is two-fold: working 
to influence public opinion on Antarctic environmental issues, and working to promote 
environmental considerations within the ATS. Tin has argued that the work if ENGOs for influence in 
the ATS is a year-round occupation, and thus it is insufficient to solely look at their contribution to 
meetings (2013, p. 419). Despite working in the context of the ATS, Antarctic-focused ENGOs 
operate in a very similar way to ENGOs working with other environmental concerns. These actions 
include lobbying, conducting scientific research, carrying out media work, participating in and 
organizing intersession and informal meetings, and researching and preparing papers to present at 
official meetings (Tin 2013). During official meetings ENGOS present papers and are frequently 
involved in the national delegations of ATCPs, and thus must work with diplomats to push objectives 
that reflect their environmental values. Another important avenue that can be used to apply 
pressure on government representatives is through behind-the-scenes, informal discussions during 
breaks, where ENGOs representatives can “gather information on the positions of different 
countries and work to influence the opinions of key delegates” (Tin 2013, p. 420). It has been widely 
acknowledged that, in particularly with the ATS, “a great deal of ENGOs’ work is accomplished 
through informal discussion and alliance-building in hallways, private meetings and coffee breaks, 
out of the burning spotlight of the meeting”, and thus informal, one-one-one human relationships 
often “form the foundations on which many decisions in the CEP and ATCM are made” (O’Reilly 
(forthcoming) in Tin 2013, pp. 417-220). As will be discussed subsequently, however, these informal 
sessions make it exceptionally difficult to judge exactly how much influence ENGOs have in 
environmental governance.  
Roura and Tin have argued that the influence of ENGOs in the ATS has been enhanced by their ability 
to wear several different hats, changing roles between watchdog, partner, dreamer and advisors to 
Treaty parties (2014, p. 265). By playing the role of watchdog, ENGOs monitor activities in 
Antarctica, challenge the ATS agenda and push for alternative agendas, and monitor and report any 
environmental abuses to the rest of the world (Tin 2013, p. 421). Within this role ENGOs can take 
both an adversarial position, standing in opposition to the various positions of national delegations, 
or, as Tin suggests, “a role closer to that of Jiminy Cricket who constantly nags at Pinocchio and 
reminds him to do the right thing” (2013, p. 422). By flipping between these positions ENGOs are 
able to “tap into the sensibilities of different key players”, thus increasing their influence (Tin 2013, 
p. 422). ENGOs furthermore play a role as partners and technical advisors to treaty parties. As noted 
by Tin “ASOC has made use of the expertise of its members to gain respect from and acceptance 
within the ATS”, reflecting the legitimacy derived from acceptance within an international regime 
(2013, p. 423). ENGOs submit working papers to meetings unsolicited, and while these are met with 
varying degrees of welcome, Tin suggests “that with the right amount of lobbying in advanced they 
can be significantly debated and included in the final draft” of agreements (2013, p. 423). ENGOs 
fianlly take on the role of dreamers or visionaries, drawing attention to issues are yet to receive 
attention and constantly reminding parties of “the need for vision, long-term and large-scale 
strategies and proactive engagement” (Tin 2013, p. 424). ENGOs are also the prime actors that can 
embrace the ethical foundations of the Antarctic Treaty and can promote the need for lasting 
environmental protection, unhampered by national and commercial considerations such as 
commercial profits, geopolitical interests and national prestige (Tin 2013, p. 424).  
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3 ENGO Involvement in Establishing the Ross Sea MPA 
The establishment of the Ross Sea marine protected area agreement in 2016 provides an interesting 
case-study into the role and impact of ENGOs in international environmental regimes. Assessing the 
influence of any actor in the international sphere is a difficult task. Corell and Betsill (2008), 
however, have developed an analytical framework that is useful in considering the influence of 
ENGOs with particular regard to international negotiations. This approach will be outlined and 
loosely used as a framework to help demonstrate the influence of ENGO involvement in the Ross Sea 
MPA negotiating process. This section will proceed in three parts. First, it will briefly outline the Ross 
Sea MPA agreement. It will then go on to examine the general role of ENGOs in the process. Finally, 
it outline and apply Corell and Betsill’s analytical framework in an attempt to assess the level of 
influence that ENGOs may have had in the process of establishing the Ross Sea MPA agreement. 
3.1 The Ross Sea MPA agreement 
In October 2016, CCAMLR members agreed to designate a 1.55 million km2 area of ocean in the Ross 
Sea a marine protected area following a joint proposal by New Zealand and the United States. Initial 
separate proposals were made by the United States and New Zealand in 2011, which were 
subsequently combined into a single proposal in 2013. Between 2011 and 2015, Ross Sea MPA 
proposals were repeatedly blocked several actors, including Russia, Ukraine and China. Key concerns 
raised by these states included the “duration of the MPA, the process to support research and 
monitoring and the implications for fisheries” (Cordonnery et al. 2015, p. 742). Cordonnery et al. 
note that Russia in particular was opposed to the proposals, “raising the issue of the size of the 
proposed MPAs, the arbitrary nature of their boundaries which it alleged did not take into account 
the distribution of ecosystem and biotypes, along with the irrelevance of further closed areas to 
fishing when long-term area closures already exist within CCAMLR” (2015, p. 743).  Russia was 
arguably the key actor in the 2016 negotiations, and significant diplomatic efforts were made to gain 
their support (Davison 2016). The establishment of the Ross Sea MPA is situated in the wider context 
of attempts to set up a network of MPAs throughout the Southern Ocean. In 2002 agreements were 
made at World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg to designate a series of MPAs 
by in the Southern Ocean by 2012 (Cordonnery et al. 2015, p. 731). While the Ross Sea and South 
Orkney Islands are the only MPAs so far, other areas proposed for marine protection include the 
Weddell Sea, areas around the Antarctic Peninsula and off the coast of East Antarctica. 
3.2 ENGO public involvement in protection of the Ross Sea 
As noted previously, ASOC and the IUCN are the predominant ENGOs involved in Antarctic 
protection due to their observer status at CCAMLR and ATCM meetings. Throughout the last decade, 
however, both Greenpeace the Antarctic Ocean Alliance (AOA) have played a significant role in 
promoting the protection of the Ross Sea. The creation of a network of marine protected areas in 
the Antarctic is one of ASOC’s two main goals. ASOC’s public outreach campaign for the Ross Sea has 
included media releases giving updates on the progress of the MPA, regular blog posts, and raising 
public awareness through their website (ASOC 2016a). ASOC is also a member of the Antarctic 
Ocean Alliance (AOA), a consortium of 23 different organizations campaigning for protection of the 
Ross Sea. AOA was formed in 2010 following CCAMLR’s commitment to establish a network of 
marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean (AOA 2017). AOA has an extensive public outreach 
campaign, including several celebrity ambassadors such Leonardo DiCaprio, Sylvia Earle, Edward 
Norton, Richard Branson and Sam Neill. They have significant online presence, publishing 
T. Lord, p. 13 
 
informational videos on Youtube and regular online blog posts. AOA also have a link on their website 
for the public to send an email directly to their national foreign minister regarding protection of the 
Ross Sea, and also have a petition to CCAMLR to designate the Ross Sea a MPA which has generated 
over 320,000 submissions. AOA have furthermore published eight detailed reports on the need for 
marine protection in the Ross Sea, including Antarctic Ocean Legacy: A Vision for Circumpolar 
Protection and Antarctic Ocean Legacy: A Marine Reserve for the Ross Sea which were submitted by 
ASOC to the ATCM XXXV in Hobart, 2012. 
A further actor engaged in significant public outreach with regard to protection of the Ross Sea is the 
Last Ocean. Established in 2004 and a member of both ASOC and AOA, the Last Ocean has a the 
explicit goal of promoting “the establishment of a marine protected area in order to conserve the 
pristine qualities of the Ross Sea” (The Last Ocean 2017). In 2012 the Last Ocean released a feature-
length film of the same title, addressing the issue of Antarctic toothfish fisheries in the Ross Sea. 
Throughout 2012 and 2013 the film was toured around independent film festivals in North America 
and Europe and the director and founders hosted regular question and answer sessions about the 
film. During the tour they attempted to lobby supermarkets to stop selling Antarctic toothfish, and 
asked consumers not to purchase it (The Last Ocean 2017). The Last Ocean also have an online blog 
and their website has links to AOAs submissions and petitions. 
The IUCN are a further ENGO that has had a stake in the establishment of Antarctic MPAs. While, as 
previously stated, the ICUN take a more knowledge based approach (rather than public outreach), 
they have extensive information on MPAs in general, Antarctic marine protection and the Ross Sea 
MPA on their website. Major publications from the IUCN include Establishing Resilient Marine 
Protected Area Networks — Making It Happen (2008) and Marine Protected Areas and climate 
change: Adaptation and mitigation synergies, opportunities and challenges (2016). As observers to 
ATCMs they have furthermore submitted five information papers regarding Antarctic MPAs between 
1999 and 2012. Greenpeace have also supported the Ross Sea MPA, publishing a report on the 
subject in 2010, entitled Defending the Last Ocean.  
3.3 Assessing ENGO involvement at international environmental negotiations 
It is clear that ENGOs in the case of Ross Sea marine protection have acted in ways consistent with 
ENGOs in the wider global context. Yet ENGOs have been substantially involved in CCCAMLR and 
ATCM meetings too. As previously noted, ASOC and the IUCN are the only two ENGOs to have 
observer status in both CCMALR and ATCM meetings. ASOC in particular is very active in submitting 
information papers for consideration at ATCMs. Between 1999 and 2016 ASOC tabled 16 
information papers on the subject of MPAs, while the IUCN tabled five, bringing the total to 21. The 
next closest in terms of paper submissions is the United Kingdom, who tabled seven independent 
papers plus one joint paper, followed by Belgium who tabled three independent papers and two 
joint papers. Corell and Betsill have noted, however, that participation at meetings does not 
necessarily translate to influence (2008, p. 26). Thus, just because a particular agreement 
corresponds to the views of ENGOs on the issue, it does not necessarily follow that ENGOs were 
responsible for the agreement (Corell and Betsill 2008, p. 30).  
Corell and Betsill believe that confusion between involvement and influence can be avoided by 
researchers focussing on two main questions: what did the ENGOs do in a given negotiating context, 
and what were the observable effects, focussing in particular “on issue framing, agenda-setting, the 
T. Lord, p. 14 
 
positions of key states, and procedural and substantive outcome” (2008, p. 25). To examine the 
observable effects, Corell and Betsill suggest using a method of process tracing. Process tracing 
refers to the exercise of “building a logical chain of evidence linking communication from NGO 
diplomats with other actors, actors’ response/nonresponse, and effects/noneffects of that 
communication” (Corell and Betsill 2008, p. 30). This allows for the researcher to examine “the 
causal links between NGO diplomacy and observed effects… [helping to] identify the conditions 
under which NGOs exert influence. The following section with examine the observable effects of 
ENGO involvement in the Ross Sea MPA agreement by using Corell and Betsill’s five indicators. As 
the main ENGO involved in negotiations, ASOC will be the primary focus of analyses.  
3.3.1 Issue framing  
Issue framing refers to how an environmental problem is conceptualized prior to and during 
negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008, p. 33). Through framing (and re-framing) environmental issuess 
NGO can establish the boundaries within which state must formulate their response (Betsill and 
Corell 2008, p. 33). It can be argued that ASOC helped frame the Ross Sea MPA debate in two keys 
ways. First, ASOC helped frame the establishment of MPAs as an issue that should be addressed 
through cooperation between CAMMLR and the Committee on Environmental Protection (CEP), the 
AT organ born from the Madrid Protocol responsible for providing environmental advice to ATCPs. 
This need for cooperation was argued in ASOC’s IP 87 ‘Marine Protected Areas – Steps Forward’ at 
the ATCM XXX in 2007, (ASOC 2007, p. 6), and again in IP 119 ‘Designation of Marine Protected Areas 
within the Antarctic Treaty Area’, at the ATCM XXXI (ASOC 2008, p. 8). The need for cooperation 
between CAMMLR and the CEP was subsequently acknowledged by the United Kingdom at the 
ATCM XXXI, and this concern was included in working papers submitted in both 2009 and 2010, 
which were met with strong support from several parties (Antarctic Treaty 2009, p. 116 para. 224; 
Antarctic Treaty 2010, p. 26 para. 44-45). This arguably demonstrates response by an actor to the 
framing of an issue by ASOC. Second, throughout the negotiations both ASOC and the IUCN 
consistently argued for to the need to establish comprehensive MPA networks in the Southern 
Ocean, thus framing the issue of the Ross Sea MPA not in isolation but rather as the first step in a 
wider project for comprehensive marine protection. This again has been reflected in reports and 
statements made by many ATCPs. ASOC have thus contributed to the framing of the MPA issue by 
continuously reminding ATCPs of their commitments to the establishment of a network of MPAs. It 
remains to be seen, however, if further MPAs will be agreed upon in the near future.  
3.3.2 Agenda setting 
A second key indicator of the influence of NGOs in negotiations is agenda setting. Agenda setting 
refers how the key issues that the negotiations may focus are decided upon. This is arguably where 
ENGOs have had the most impact. Between 2007 and 2012 ASOC kept the issue of MPA high on the 
agenda for both CCMALR and at ATCMs, demonstrated by the information papers they submitted 
and their constant urging for parties to meet the 2012 goal of MPAs (ASOC 2011, p. 3). While it is 
recognized that ASOC helped to keep this debate going, it is interesting to note that after the 2012 
date for the establishment of a network of MPAs was missed ASOC did not table another 
information paper specifically on MPAs until 2016. While they remained vocal supporters of MPAs in 
CCAMLR and spoke out strongly with each failed year, this does not seem to have translated into 
pressure being applied at ATCMs with the submission of information papers. While this could 
perhaps be seen as ASOC ‘giving up’ on the issue of MPAs, that their public campaign continued 
suggests that this was not the case. Another example of ENGO agenda-setting is in ASOC’s specific 
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push for the Ross Sea MPA. ASOC was the first party to suggest this MPA, presenting IP 48 at the 
ATCM XXXII in 2009 ‘A Ross Sea MPA: Preservation for science’ which argued the case for an MPA in 
the Ross Sea (ASOC 2009, p. 3). Further arguments for a Ross Sea MPA were made in information 
papers in 2010 and 2012. Proposals for a Ross Sea MPA were subsequently made by the United 
States and New Zealand in 2011 which they continued to push for until the Ross Sea MPA was 
agreed to in 2016. It would be exceptionally difficult to attempt measure how much influence ASOC 
might have had on New Zealand and the United States in proposing a Ross Sea MPA. After all, both 
parties may have been considering making proposals prior to ASOC’s submissions. However it is 
worth noting the continued failure of agreement regarding the combined Australian, French and EU 
proposal for an East Antarctic MPA (CCAMLR 2015, p. 352), which has so far received little direct 
ENGO attention, compared to the success of the Ross Sea MPA agreement. The attention/lack of 
attention afforded to both these MPAs by ENGOs could arguably be considered to reflect the 
influence NGOs in setting the agenda for a Ross Sea MPA.  
3.3.3 Positions of key actors 
A third indicator suggested by Corell and Betsill is the positions of key actors, and if these were 
shaped or changed by ENGO during the negotiations (2008, p. 34). Throughout the negotiations 
concerns were mostly raised by the delegates from Russia, Ukraine and China (Antarctic Treaty 2013; 
Antarctic Treaty 2014). Corell and Betsill note that this is where diplomacy can take place at the 
domestic level, through ENGO direct action and participating in national discussions, as well as at the 
international level through lobbying at negotiations (2008, p. 36). As previously discussed, a lot of 
ENGO lobbying takes places on an informal and interpersonal level during meeting breaks, and 
therefore the influence of ENGOs on the shift in position of these states is largely unknown. It is 
important to note that there are a significant number of variable affecting states positions 
negotiations. Many states may have simply been appeased by changes to the agreement, such as 
China in 2015 (Antarctic Treaty 2015). While the Ukraine originally supported Russia in blocking the 
Ross Sea MPA, it is speculated that Ukraine revised their position following Russia’s annexing of 
Crimea in 2014 (Sheriff 2014). In the context of the ATS it is challenging to pinpoint the exact 
influence of ENGOs on other key actors due a lack of substantial information, and is therefore a field 
of research that would require much more attention than this paper can afford. 
3.3.4 Outcome of the agreement: procedural and substantive 
A fourth indicator of ENGOs involvement in negotiations can be seen in the outcome of the 
agreement. Corell and Betsill break this into two categorie: procedural issues and substantive issues 
(2008, p. 35). Procedural issues refer to the “facilitation of NGO participation in future decision 
making processes” (Corell and Betsill 2008, p. 35). ASOC has arguably not managed to influence 
procedural issues, as conversations surrounding the Ross Sea MPA have not revolved around the 
mechanisms of the creation of MPAs. In this case, therefore, procedural issues are largely irrelevant. 
The second category is substantive issues of the final agreement, or if the final Ross Sea MPA 
agreement reflects the positions of ENGOs involved (Betsill and Corell 2008, p. 35). This also can be 
particularly difficult to assess, however. For one thing, the goals of NGOs can be ambiguous and may 
not simply revolve around the outcome of a negotiation, but also may focus on the process of the 
negotiations (Corell and Betsill 2008, p. 27). For example, the goal of an ENGO may be simply to raise 
awareness for a particular issues, and therefore any conversations by states surrounding the issue 
might be considered a success. Corell and Betsill furthermore note that NGOs frequently change 
their goals throughout negotiations towards a position they may see as more attainable (2008, p. 
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27). Conversely, ENGOs may publically promote extreme positions as a strategy to pull decision-
makers in new directions, yet privately expect more moderate results (Corell and Bestsill 2008, p. 
27).  
With regard to the Ross Sea MPA, ENGOs have considered it a major victory. Despite urging 
countries to ‘go further’ with regard to marine protection, AOA (2016) described the agreement as 
‘momentous’, while Greenpeace published an enthusiastic blog post entitle: ‘Victory! World’s largest 
marine protected area established off Antarctica!’ (Mackenzie 2016). The agreement for the 1.55 
million km2 Ross Sea MPA, however, falls well short of the 3.6 million km2 proposed by AOA in 2012 
report Antarctic Ocean Legacy: A Marine Reserve for the Ross Sea tabled at the ATCM XXXV. 
Furthermore, the agreement provides for the MPA to be renegotiated in 35 years’ time, falling short 
of the goal of comprehensive and permanent protection for the Ross Sea (AOA 2012). This was 
reflected in ASOC’s press release, which stated that while ASOC was thrilled with the extent of the 
Ross Sea MPA, they were “disappointed that CCAMLR could not agree to permanently protect the 
Ross Sea” (ASOC 2016b). This agreement furthermore happened four years later than initially hoped 
for. Despite these imperfections, in their closing remarks at the CCAMLR meeting in 2016 ASOC 
stated: “We think this is a significant achievement for CCAMLR and all its Members that represents 
the spirit of cooperation that CCAMLR is known for,” and that “we are looking forward to working 
together to make additional progress on MPAs over the coming years” (CCAMLR 2016, p. 51 para 
8.70).  
By examining these four indicators in a process tracing exercise it has been demonstrated that ASOC 
has had a substantial influence on the establishment of the Ross Sea MPA agreement. While their 
exact contribution the proceedings cannot be measured effectively, by examining the activities and 
actions of ENGOs in regard to the Ross Sea MPA agreement it become apparent that they have 
affected the process. As Cordonnery et al. before the agreement was reached, without ENGO 
involvement “one would have to suppose that the serial failures in relation to MPA designation over 
recent years [would] encourage the hitherto proponent states to allow the issue to lose profile” 
(Cordonnery et al. 2015, p. 743). Although unable to participate fully in the process due to their 
limited observer status, ASOC’s major role in the negotiating process was there keeping the issue 
alive and on the agenda for ATCPs.  
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the involvement of environmental nongovernmental organization (ENGOs) 
as actors in international environmental regimes. It has demonstrated that despite the unique 
geopolitics in the Antarctic region, wider trends in ENGO involvement in environmental regimes 
remain constant. Through employing Corell and Betsill’s analytical framework for examining the 
influence of ENGOs in international environmental, the case-study of the Ross Sea MPA agreement 
has demonstrated that ENGOs have had a considerable role in influencing the proceedings. Overall, 
however, the field of ENGOs in as actors in international environmental politics is under-theorized, 
especially with regard to the Antarctic. This paper has suggested that ENGOs can be considered 
valuable actors environmental regimes due to their ability to operate as a nexus between states and 
the public. They can therefore argue for greater environmental protection fee from geopolitical or 
commercial interest. Thus, Tin notes that “in this regard, ENGOs represent the sole voice that speaks 
out for environmental protection as a top priority” (2013, p. 424).   
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